

THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AS COUNTERPART TO
PHYSIOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY.

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There is the widest divergence among psychologists as to the nature of Social Psychology. The most recent text-book under this title — the *Social Psychology* of Professor Ross — opens with this sentence: "Social Psychology, as the writer conceives it, studies the psychic planes and currents that come into existence among men in consequence of their association." That is, it must confine itself to the "uniformities in feeling, belief, or volition — and hence in action — which are due to the interaction of human beings." Here we find a certain field of human experience cut off from the rest, because men and women influence each other within that field. There result certain uniformities from this interaction and this makes the subject-matter of the science of social psychology. In the same manner one might investigate the psychology of mountain tribes because they are subject to the influence of high altitudes and rugged landscape. Sociality is for Professor Ross no fundamental feature of human consciousness, no determining form of its structure.

In the *Social Psychology* of McDougall, which appeared but a few months before the treatise we have just mentioned, human consciousness is conceived of as determined by social instincts, whose study reveals sociality not as the result of interaction but as the medium within which intelligence and human emotion must arise.

If we turn to standard treatises on Psychology, we find the social aspect of human consciousness dealt with in very varying fashion. Royce, both in his psychology and in the volume, *Studies in Good and Evil*, makes out of the consciousness of one self over against other selves the source of all reflection. Thought, according to Professor Royce,

in its dependence upon symbolic means of expression, has arisen out of intercourse, and presupposes, not only in the forms of language, but in the meanings of language, social consciousness. Only through imitation and opposition to others could one's own conduct and expression gain any meaning for one's self, not to speak of the interpretation of the conduct of others through one's own imitative responses to their acts. Here we stand upon the familiar ground of Professor Baldwin's studies of social consciousness. The *ego* and the *socius* are inseparable, and the medium of alternative differentiation and identification is imitation. But from the point of view of their psychological treatises we feel that these writers have said too much or too little of the form of sociality. If we turn to the structural psychologists we find the social aspect of consciousness appearing only as one of the results of certain features of our affective nature and its bodily organism. The self arises in the individual consciousness through apperceptive organization and enters into relation with other selves to whom it is adapted by organic structure. In Professor James's treatise the self is brilliantly dealt with in a chapter by itself. Within that chapter we see that, as a self, it is completely knit into a social consciousness, that the diameter of the self waxes and wanes with the field of social activity, but what the value of this nature of the self is for the cognitive and emotional phases of consciousness we do not discover. In the genetic treatment given by Professor Angell, the last chapter deals with the self. Here indeed we feel the form of sociality is the culmination, and the treatment of attention, of the impulses, and the emotions, and finally of volition involves so definitely a social organization of consciousness, that in the light of the last chapter the reader feels that a rereading would give a new meaning to what has gone before. If we except Professor Cooley, in his *Human Nature and the Social Order*, and his *Social Organization*, the sociologists have no adequate social psychology with which to interpret their own science. The modern sociologists neither abjure psychology with Comte, nor determine what the value of the social character of human consciousness is for the psychology which they attempt to use.

To repeat the points of view we have noted, some see in social consciousness nothing but uniformities in conduct and feeling that result from the interaction of men and women, others recognize a consciousness that is organized through social instincts, others still find in the medium of communication and the thought that depends upon it, a social origin for reflective consciousness itself, still others find the social aspect of human nature to be only the product of an already organized

intelligence responding to certain social impulses, while others find that an organized intelligence in the form of a self could arise only over against other selves that must exist in consciousness as immediately as the subject self, still others are content to recognize necessary social conditions in the genesis of volition and the self that expresses itself in volition.

Now it is evident that we cannot take both positions. We cannot assume that the self is both a product and a presupposition of human consciousness, that reflection has arisen through social consciousness and that social intercourse has arisen because human individuals had ideas and meanings to express.

I desire to call attention to the implications for psychology of the positions defended by McDougall, by Royce and Baldwin respectively, if they are consistently maintained. The positions I have in mind are the following: that human nature is endowed with and organized by social instincts and impulses; that the consciousness of meaning has arisen through social intercommunication; and finally that the *ego*, the self, that is implied in every act, in every volition, with reference to which our primary judgments of valuation are made, must exist in a social consciousness within which the *socii*, the other selves, are as immediately given as is the subject self.

McDougall lists eleven human instincts: flight, repulsion, curiosity, pugnacity, subjection, self-display, the parental instinct, the instinct of reproduction, the gregarious instinct, the instinct of acquisition, and the instinct of construction. Six of these are social, without question: pugnacity, subjection, self-display, the parental instinct, the instinct of reproduction, and the gregarious instinct. These would probably be the instincts most widely accepted by those who are willing to accept human instincts at all. Four of the others, repulsion, curiosity, acquisition, and construction, would be questionable, or conceivably to be resolved into other instincts. The fact is that McDougall has his doctrine of instincts so essentially bound up with a doctrine of emotions and sentiments that he is evidently forced to somewhat strain his table of instincts to get in the proper number of corresponding emotions. But the fact that is of moment is that the psychologist who recognizes instincts and impulses will find among them a preponderating number that are social. By a social instinct is meant a well defined tendency to act under the stimulation of another individual of the same species. If selfconscious conduct arises out of controlled and organized impulse, and impulses arise out of social instincts, and the responses to these social stimulations become stimuli to corresponding social acts on the

part of others, it is evident that human conduct was from the beginning of its development in a social medium. The implication is highly important for its bearing upon the theory of imitation, which, as is indicated above, plays a great part in current social psychology.

There are two implications of the theory that important social instincts lie behind developed human consciousness—two to which I wish to call attention. The first is that any such group of instincts inevitably provides the content and the form of a group of social objects. An instinct implies first of all a certain type of stimulus to which the organism is attuned. This sensuous content will attract the attention of the individual to the exclusion of other stimuli. And the organism will respond to it by a certain attitude that represents the group of responses for which such an instinct is responsible. These two are the characteristics of an object in our consciousness—a content toward which the individual is susceptible as a stimulus, and an attitude of response toward this peculiar type of content. In our consciousness of this sensuous content and of our attitude toward it we have both the content of the object as a thing and the meaning of it, both the perception and the concept of it, at least implicit in the experience. The implication of an organized group of social instincts is the implicit presence in undeveloped human consciousness of both the matter and the form of a social object.

The second implication has to do with the theory of imitation. Social instincts imply that certain attitudes and movements of one form are stimuli in other forms to certain types of response. In the instinct of fighting these responses will be of one sort, in that of parental care another. The responses will be adapted to the stimulus and may vary from it or may approach it in its own form or outward appearance. It may be that, as in the case of the gregarious instinct, the action of one form may be a stimulus to the other to do the same thing—to the member of the herd, for example, to run away in the direction in which another member of the herd is running. We have no evidence that such a reaction is any more an imitation than if the instinctive response were that of running away from an enemy which threatened the animal. Furthermore, a group of well organized social instincts will frequently lead one form to place another under the influence of the same stimuli which are affecting it. Thus a parent form, taking a young form with it in its own hunting, subjects the instincts which the child form has inherited to the same stimuli as those which arouse the hunting reaction in the parent form. In various ways it is possible that the action of one form should serve directly or indirectly to

mobilize a similar instinct in another form where there is no more question of imitation than there is in the case in which the action of one form calls out, for the protection of life, a diametrically opposite reaction. Another phase of the matter is also of importance for the interpretation of the so-called imitative processes, in lower animal forms and in the conduct of young children. I refer to what Professor Baldwin has been pleased to call the circular reaction, the instance in which, in his terminology, the individual imitates himself. One illustration of this, that of mastication, which sets free the stimuli which again arouse the masticating reflexes, is a purely mechanical circle, similar to that which is responsible for the rhythmical processes of walking, but which has no important likeness to such processes as that of learning to talk. In the latter experiences the child repeats continually a sound which he has mastered, perhaps without being perceptibly influenced by the sounds about him — the da-da-da, the ma-ma-ma, of the earliest articulation. Here we have the child producing the stimulus which in a socially organized human animal calls for a response of another articulation. We see the same thing probably in a bird's insistent repetition of its own notes. The child is making the first uncertain efforts to speak — in this case to himself, that is, in response to an articulate sound which operates as a stimulus upon his auditory apparatus as inevitably as if the sound were made by another. The bird is responding to the note he sings himself as definitely as if he responded to a note uttered by another bird. In neither case is there any evidence that the sound which is the stimulus operates by its quality to induce the child or the bird to produce a sound which shall be like that which is heard. Under the influence of social instincts, animals and young children or primitive peoples may be stimulated to many reactions which are like those which directly or indirectly are responsible for them without there being any justification for the assumption that the process is one of imitation — in any sense which is connoted by that term in our own consciousness. When another self is present in consciousness doing something, then such a self may be imitated by the self that is conscious of him in his conduct, but by what possible mechanism, short of a miracle, the conduct of one form should act as a stimulus to another to do, not what the situation calls for, but something like that which the first form is doing, is beyond ordinary comprehension. Imitation becomes comprehensible when there is a consciousness of other selves, and not before. However, an organization of social instincts gives rise to many situations which have the outward appearance of imitation, but

these situations — those in which, under the influence of social stimulation, one form does what others are doing — are no more responsible for the appearance in consciousness of other selves that answer to our own than are the situations which call out different and even opposed reactions. Social consciousness is the presupposition of imitation, and when Professor Royce, both in the eighth chapter of *Studies of Good and Evil*, and in the twelfth chapter of his *Outlines of Psychology* makes imitation the means of getting the meaning of what others and we ourselves are doing, he seems to be either putting the cart before the horse, or else to be saying that the ideas which we have of the actions of others are ideo-motor in their character, but this does not make out of imitation the means of their becoming ideo-motor. The sight of a man pushing a stone registers itself as a meaning through a tendency in ourselves to push the stone, but it is a far call from this to the statement that it is first through imitation of him or some one else pushing stones that we have gained the motor-idea of stone-pushing.

The important character of social organization of conduct or behavior through instincts is not that one form in a social group does what the others do, but that the conduct of one form is a stimulus to another to a certain act, and that this act again becomes a stimulus to first to a certain reaction, and so on in ceaseless interaction. The likeness of the actions is of minimal importance compared with the fact that the actions of one form have the implicit meaning of a certain response to another form. The probable beginning of human communication was in coöperation, not in imitation, where conduct differed and yet where the act of the one answered to and called out the act of the other. The conception of imitation as it has functioned in social psychology needs to be developed into a theory of social stimulation and response and of the social situations which these stimulations and responses create. Here we have the matter and the form of the social object, and here we have also the medium of communication and reflection.

The second position to which I wish to call attention, and whose implications I wish to discuss, is that the consciousness of meaning is social in its origin. The dominant theory at present, that which is most elaborately stated by Wundt in the first volume of his *Völkerpsychologie*, regards language as the outgrowth of gesture, the vocal gesture. As a gesture, it is primarily an expression of emotion. But the gesture itself is a syncopated act, one that has been cut short, a torso which conveys the emotional import of the act. Out of the emotional signification has grown the intellectual signification. It is evi-

dent that but for the original situation of social interaction the bodily and vocal gestures could never have attained their signification. It is their reference to other individuals that has turned expression, as a mere outflow of nervous excitement, into meaning, and this meaning was the value of the act for the other individual, and his response to the expression of the emotion, in terms of another syncopated act, with its social signification, gave the first basis for communication, for common understanding, for the recognition of the attitudes which men mutually held toward each other within a field of social interaction. Attitudes had meanings when they reflected possible acts. And the acts could have meanings when they called out definite reactions which call out still other appropriate responses; that is, when the common content of the act is reflected by the different parts played by individuals, through gestures — truncated acts. Here is the birth of the symbol, and the possibility of thought. Still, thought remains in its abstractest form sublimated conversation. Thus reflective consciousness implies a social situation which has been its precondition. Antecedent to the reflective consciousness within which we exist, in the beginnings of the society of men and in the life of every child that arises to reflective consciousness, there must have been this condition of interrelation by acts springing from social instincts.

Finally, Professor Baldwin has abundantly exemplified the interdependence of the *ego* and the *socius*, of the self and the other. It is still truer to say the self and the *others*, the *ego* and the *socii*. If the self-form is an essential form of all our consciousness it necessarily carries with it the other-form. Whatever may be the metaphysical impossibilities or possibilities of solipsism, psychologically it is non-existent. There must be other selves if one's own is to exist. Psychological analysis, retrospection, and the study of children and primitive people give no inkling of situations in which a self could have existed in consciousness except as the counterpart of other selves. We even can recognize that in the definition of these selves in consciousness, the child and primitive man have defined the outlines and the character of the others earlier than they have defined their own selves. We may fairly say a social group is an implication of the structure of the only consciousness that we know.

If these positions are correct it is evident that we must be as much beholden to social science to present and analyze the social group with its objects, its interrelations, its selves, as a precondition of our reflective and self-consciousness, as we are beholden to physiological science to present and analyze the physical complex which is the pre-condition

of our physical consciousness. In other words, a social psychology should be the counterpart of physiological psychology. In each case the conditions under which certain phases of consciousness arise must be studied by other sciences, because the consciousness which the psychologist analyzes presupposes objects and processes which are preconditions of itself and its processes. It is true that our reflection can sweep the very physical and social objects which the physical and social sciences have presented within itself, and regard them as psychological presentations. But in doing this it is presupposing another brain that conditions its action, and whose defection would bring collapse to the very thought that reduced the brain to states of consciousness. In the same manner we may wipe the *alteri* out of existence and reduce our social world to our individual selves, regarding the others as constructions of our own, but we can only do it to some other audience with whom our thought holds converse, even if this self is only the I and the Me of actual thought, but behind these protagonists stand the chorus of others to whom we rehearse our reasonings by word of mouth or through the printed page.

The evolutionary social science which shall describe and explain the origins of human society, and the social sciences which shall finally determine what are the laws of social growth and organization, will be as essential for determining the objective conditions of social consciousness, as the biological sciences are to determine the conditions of consciousness in the biological world. By no possibility can psychology deal with the material with which physiology and the social sciences deal, because the consciousness of psychological science arises within a physical and a social world that are presuppositions of itself. From a logical point of view a social psychology is strictly parallel to a physiological psychology.

DISCUSSION.

WHAT IS SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY?

EDITOR PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN:

Some criticisms on the view I take as to the scope of social psychology in a recent text-book on the subject¹ seem to make it worth while for me to present such justification as I have to offer.

It is becoming clear that there are two competing notions as to what is the subject matter of social psychology. One is the notion held by Baldwin, McDougall and others that social psychology is the psychology of the individual in association; the other is the view represented by Tarde and other continental writers that social psychology is the psychology of society, or, if you please, the consideration of great-scale psychic phenomena. The writer has endeavored to make this conception more precise by defining it as the study of "the psychic planes and currents that come into existence among men in consequence of their association."

The former conception would make social psychology a branch of psychology; the latter would make it a branch of sociology. There is no doubt that there are here two rising and substantial bodies of valuable knowledge competing for the use of the same designation. Whichever succeeds in getting itself called 'social psychology,' the other will, no doubt, contrive to flourish under some other name. The point at issue is not of primary importance, but it is worth while to offer some reasons why it seems better to reserve the term 'social psychology' to designate a branch of sociology.

If out of human psychology be carved a province to be known as social psychology, having to do with all phenomena of the individual mind which arise out of or imply association with other minds, then logically the rest of the science will be known as 'individual psychology,' and will deal with everything in mental development which does not presuppose association. It is hardly necessary to point out that no such line of cleavage has been recognized by the psychologists, nor is it likely to be. A large part of what has been called simply 'psychology' would have to be turned over to 'social psychology.' Not only would the study of the emotions fall under the latter head,

¹ *Social Psychology. An Outline and Source Book.* New York, 1908.

seeing that most of them — love, jealousy, resentment, shame, envy, pity, gratitude, reverence, ambition, etc. — imply a relation to other beings like ourselves, *i. e.*, association, but that of the higher cognitive processes as well — comparison, analysis, abstraction, conception, judgment, reasoning, invention, self-consciousness. Not only would 'individual psychology' come off rather badly in the division, but it would be put in the absurd position of having a myth or a monstrosity for its subject matter — for we have never met nor are likely to meet human beings whose mental life has not been built up on a basis of interplay with other minds, while it is probable that a human being reared under strict isolation would be scarcely distinguishable from an animal or an idiot. It appears then that psychology is not likely to turn over a defined portion of its field to 'social psychology' leaving the residue to constitute the domain of 'individual psychology.'

How is it with sociology?

In consequence of imitation, interference, conflict, discussion, compromise, etc., we find people ranged into great alignments which I have termed 'social planes' and 'social currents' — the former referring to the mental uniformities produced by tradition, convention and rational imitation, the latter referring to the transient uniformity seen in mobs, 'booms,' panics, stampedes, 'landslides,' crazes and fads. These unities are purely mental and do not imply anything in the way of combined action or practical coöperation. The study of them can very naturally be termed 'social psychology.' Beyond this comes the study of the groupings of men for the realization of joint purposes by means of combined effort. This branch of sociology might well be termed 'social morphology,' the study of *social forms*. It is not for a moment to be supposed that the consideration of human groupings such as family, clan, tribe, nation, society, union, church, corporation, or party does not involve attention to many psychological processes as, for example, the emergence of a group consciousness, the formation of a group will, the reaction of the group self upon the personal self. Nevertheless, the principal determinant factors in the life history of the group are to be sought in its constitution and form as, for example, the number of persons associated, whether they are alike or dissimilar, equal or graded, assembled or dispersed, in direct relations or in indirect relations, in constant touch or in occasional touch, whether their association is open or exclusive, public or secret, for general ends or for specific ends, whether the coöperation of the group is guided by the will of a preponderant number or by designated power holders, and whether these power holders are removable or ir-

removable, absolute or responsible, chosen for term or for life, limited in their powers or unlimited.

According to this view the theory of society (neglecting for the present such helpful basement sciences as demography, and 'mesology,' the study of the reaction of the physical environment) would consist of *social psychology* and *social morphology*. If the distinction drawn between these branches is reasonable and helpful, it would seem that sociology has better grounds for appropriating the term 'social psychology' than has psychology.

The writer is aware that the above view is not consistent at all points with his past expressions. Moreover, it may not agree with conclusions he will hereafter reach. There is no reason, however, why the issue presented may not be discussed strictly on its merits without *ad hominem* argument. The writer recognizes that the matter in dispute is one of scientific convenience merely, and he presents his views in the hope that they will call forth whatever weighty reasons exist on the other side of the question.

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PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY.

Human Nature in Politics. GRAHAM WALLAS. London, Archibald Constable & Co., 1908. Pp. xvi + 302. \$1.45.

The argument of Mr. Wallas runs as follows: Political science has always been grounded on a conception of 'human nature' or psychology. Criminology, education and economics have been redeemed to some extent from over-simplification, intellectualism and dogma by advances in evolutionary science and psychology, but politics remains in academic lectures and philosophies beautifully rational and symmetrical, in strong contrast with the politics of the street which successfully appeals to primitive 'irrational' motives. However, genuine political impulses are not merely intellectual inferences from calculation of means and end. Personal loyalty, fear, ridicule, the instinct of ownership, the devices of advertising, and the thousands of subtle, subconscious suggestions peculiar to the interaction of individuals in large communities, also operate, for these impulses are manifestations of racial tendencies universally present. The ground plan of human nature is relatively stable; the political environment constantly varies. Our sensations are the raw material of knowledge and represent the conscious channels through which instincts find satisfaction, and political control is often more strongly enforced by symbols drawn from perceptual objects than from ideational considerations. It is difficult to distinguish between rational and non-rational inferences, and in ordinary life no great harm is done, but the "empirical art of politics consists largely in the creation of opinion by the deliberate exploitation of subconscious, non-rational inference."

Reasoning is also a human instrument, and political thinkers must formulate a method and create entities corresponding to the abstractions of physical science. Heretofore a hypothetical 'normal' individual of invariable propensities has been constructed — the economic and political men of intelligent interests and natural rights. But biology has demonstrated the value of 'variation curves' which generalize differences and make variation the basis of uniformity. Politics must likewise reject an over-simplification of its subject matter and theory and adapt itself to quantitative methods, and repeated collection of evidence and opinion from all possible sources.

Political morality, moreover, will change; for when statesmen and citizens become conscious of their own socio-individual conscious processes, control from within becomes inevitable. Perhaps in time an acceptance of causation and 'fact' in political matters and the use of a frankly experimental method of dealing with social problems may be attended with an idealization and moral intensity which hypostatized natural science and fatalistic religion have aroused.

The theory and practice of representative government will be transformed when politics incorporates the psychological doctrine of the organic functioning of intellect, feeling and volition. The Platonic psychology of classes requires an impossible suppression of social contact: the doctrine of 'consent of the governed' implies that collective processes of reaching decisions should be encouraged and regulated: a democratic society needs the discipline which comes from communal feeling, thinking and doing.

The ancient city state was founded upon the principle of perception: it was not to be larger than the span of vision and memory. 'Delocalized' modern states, extended by our means of communication, must rest upon ideation and imagination, not upon immediate observation. Homogeneity must come not from national feeling or racial likeness, but from a recognition of common problems and variable solutions. The Darwinian struggle for supremacy, instead of fostering race hatred, may incite to generous emulation, sympathy and a placing of military instincts in social grooves.

There is a striking similarity in point of view between the contribution of Mr. Wallas and the recent work of Mr. McDougall on *Social Psychology*, although the latter book appeared after the composition of *Human Nature in Politics*. Mr. McDougall pleads for a wider conception of psychology as a 'positive science of conduct and behavior.' Mr. Wallas, aided by experience in local and national English politics, has given a first-hand psychological interpretation of the undercurrents of politics; his book is a discussion of a narrower field but with the same animus as the work of Mr. McDougall.

Instincts, habit, the 'non-rational' — all the shaded lights of consciousness — are the points of departure, and the object of the study is to formulate a working logic of political action on the basis of the evolutionary concept of human tendencies which science has developed since Bentham presented his structural analysis of the simplified middle class citizen, and to avoid the intellectualism and aloofness of neo-Hegelian political philosophers. In so doing Mr. Wallas reaches a view of the place of reason in political

life which incorporates sympathetic impulses and volition, which assumes that since instincts are the stuff to be controlled under the pressure of a constantly shifting environment, the old dualisms of socialism or individualism, government by reason and the elite or blind impulse and the mob, Utopia or chaos, are artificial abstractions which find their due place in concrete emergencies calling for tentative balancing of motive and machinery.

Mr. Wallas does not seem to view imitation as an instinct, and thereby has avoided difficulties attending the circular reaction social psychology. If, with Mr. McDougall, imitation can be resolved into ideo-motor action or combinations of genuine instincts, it is possible to regard the term as a sociological category denoting the roughly uniform repetition of action seen from the standpoint of the observer. For the actor, repetition, imitation, is simply a process of defining and directing his active tendencies. By no juggling can imitation, considered as a separate automatic instinct, become 'rational' and ascend to genius. The process of controlling conflicting instincts may not be adequate and may not come to distinct consciousness in the case of many people, but no one with racial habits and power of perception needs an additional 'instinct' of imitation: tendencies strive for expression and problems are solved in a manner not fully explained by the circular reaction. Mr. Wallas opens the door to all members of the community and invites them to become contributors to its meaning and technique of control because of their unique, individual reaction to so-called objective 'copies.' He explains uniformity on the basis of common problems, originality on the basis of variable solutions.

It is good for American pride to read that Mr. Wallas dates his inspiration to psychologize politics from the reading of James' *Principles* and that he expresses indebtedness to the writing of Jane Addams. But he has not simply applied already worked out psychological doctrines to a new subject matter: he has enlarged and enriched psychology itself by his interpretation.

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The Psychology of Prayer. ANNA LOUISE STRONG. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1909. Pp. 122. \$0.80.

Prayer is a phenomenon or aspect of the essentially social nature of man. It is an imaginative relation between selves. The self is here regarded as a construct dependent upon social life and social relationships. The process by which a self grows is *always* an 'im-

agitative social process,' whether the personal ideas concerned are referred to physical accompaniments or not. Prayer, as one form of this social process, is one of the means by which the self is built up and determined.

The psychological situation of prayer is thus conceived under the symbolism of the interaction of two selves, which are present together in consciousness and which demand some sort of readjustment. Thus there is the 'me,' or self of immediate purpose and desire, and the objectified self, the 'alter.' The aim of prayer is a unification of these two selves into a larger and more adequate selfhood. On the basis of these assumptions the author outlines the development of the prayer attitude from the indiscriminate prayers of children and primitive types of religion to the highly social and differentiated forms of the developed religious consciousness. The prayer of the child is either of a relatively mechanical character or without definite realization of the sphere or the needs for which prayer is appropriate. Discrimination develops along two lines: on the one hand with reference to efficacy in effecting changes in the external world, and on the other with reference to ethical effects and values as distinct from material needs. The child, as well as the adult of low religious development, prays indiscriminately for all kind of changes in the external world and for material benefits of all sorts, and even for the satisfaction of the slightest whims. There is little of the 'imaginative social process' involved in such prayers. Even on this low plane there are, however, fairly definite objective results, such as the 'establishment of a more confident self,' leading to more effective action, or a different interpretation of the environment, so that for the mind of the subject, there often occurs an actual readjustment of physical things by some external power to conform to his own expectant attitude. Again, sub-conscious activities may thus be set up which produce results apparently dependent upon the prayer attitude, as in cases of the healing of diseases by prayer. The completely social type of prayer is attained only when it becomes the means of establishing a really larger selfhood in the individual. This attitude in general is expressed by these words quoted by the author: "It would be a shameful misuse of prayer, if trifles which have no significance for our inner life were to be made the object of our prayers." The enlargement of the self of Augustine through this 'imaginative social process' is evident from such words as these: "Thou didst know what I was suffering and no man knew. Thou findest pleasure in us and so regardest each of us as though thou had him alone to care for."

The author regards this imaginative relation of selves as an outcome of genuine need and as one which may easily be set up even though the subject does not believe in the possibility of an actual response from some superior being. This higher social type of prayer has two fairly distinguishable aspects — the 'æsthetic' and the 'practical.' The former type embraces those forms of the prayer attitude in which there is desire for mere communion, companionship, surrender of the immediate self into a larger ideal self, but without any reference to following action. Here prayer is an end in itself, the subject is contemplative. He may or may not seek moral reinforcement. "The [practical] result obtained depends on how far the individual in question identifies the perfectly sublime and perfectly beautiful with the perfectly good."

In the case of the practical type, an ethical objective of some sort is definitely present, such as the 'conversion' of the sinner, moral reinforcement through the building up of a wider and more truly ethical self, etc. This type of prayer the author seems to regard as higher than the æsthetic.

As to the 'reality' involved in the objective reference in prayer, it is, the author holds, inadequate to say that "God makes no contribution that can be scientifically known." It is true that we cannot prove that forces enter from without the total process of experience. And yet some reality must be posited to the other self. It is "objective in the sense in which we posit anything as objective, in that it is outside of the self of immediate purpose." "An 'object' as a psychological fact is a conditioning means in the fulfilment of a purpose, which purpose is always given a subjective reference." The reality of the alter (God?) is regarded by the author as the reciprocal of the reality or organization of the immediate self. The book closes with the statement that the final solution is impossible on psychological grounds.

It seems to the reviewer that a complete and coherent account of prayer on psychological grounds should be as possible here as in the case of a phenomenon of physical science. Even there the explanation is not ultimate but is, nevertheless, coherent and complete from the point of view of physics.

The reviewer has not done full justice to the author's subtle analysis. He feels, however, that the machinery of explanation often obscures rather than clears up the phenomena in question. It is difficult, even for one who is familiar with this point of view, to avoid the feeling that a simpler terminology might have been more serviceable in stating and interpreting the same facts.

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Source Book for Social Origins: Ethnological Materials, Psychological Standpoint, Classified and Annotated Bibliographies for the Interpretation of Savage Society. WILLIAM I. THOMAS. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1909. Pp. xvi + 932. Library edition, \$4.77 postpaid; Student's edition, \$2.75.

The publication of this book should mark a long step forward in the study not only of social psychology as a college subject, but in the general movement which shows some signs of finding a new center of reference for the college course. Language and science have formed such centers hitherto, but the social and historical disciplines have been too unorganized or too abstract to fill the place which, on the face of things, the study of human life in its social relations ought to fill. In social psychology particularly the sources have been so multifarious as to present an almost trackless wilderness, into which the propounder of a theory, or the expounder of a specific topic plunged, to return indeed with material for his own purpose but without giving the student much confidence in the method, or in the unbiased character of the conclusions. The present book is admirably adapted to orient the beginner and to serve as the basis for class-room work in the subject.

There are three different kinds of matter in the book:

1. Extracts or complete papers from various authorities, of which some describe customs, institutions, art, etc., of particular peoples, while others deal with general phases of culture or their psychological interpretation. These are grouped under seven heads. The Relation of Society to Geographic and Economic Environment; Mental Life and Education; Invention and Technology; Sex and Marriage; Art, Ornament, and Decoration; Magic, Religion, Myth; Social Organization, Morals, the State. Forty-six selections are included.

2. A general introduction to the material as a whole, and a brief 'Comment' on each part. In the introduction it is maintained that while no single concept such as 'imitation,' 'conflict,' or 'constraint' is adequate to interpret the social process, the concepts of 'control' and 'attention' with the latter's attendant concepts of 'habit' and 'crisis' are highly useful as tools of analysis. In the 'comments' attention is called to changes in scientific standpoint or other considerations to be kept in mind while estimating the various material presented.

3. Bibliographies. Something over a thousand titles, classified according to the main divisions of the work, are given, and there are in addition forty-three pages of supplementary bibliographies at the close. Important works are starred and a brief annotation is given to

the most important. For the student who is already somewhat oriented in the field these bibliographies will be the most useful feature.

J. H. T.

Social Organization, A Study of the Larger Mind. CHARLES HORTON COOLEY. New York, Scribner, 1909. Pp. xvii + 426. \$1.50.

This book like its predecessor, *Human Nature and the Social Order*, is luminous in its thought, direct in method, simple in diction and style. As contrasted with the earlier work, which aimed "to see society as it exists in the social natures of man," in the present work "the eye is focused on the enlargement and diversification of intercourse which I have called social organization, the individual, though visible, remaining slightly in the background."

Parts I. and II., on 'Primary Aspects of Organization' and 'Communication' respectively, are perhaps intended for the general reader rather than for the student. They give a clear and orderly presentation of familiar material.

Part III., on 'The Democratic Mind,' and Part IV., on 'Social Classes,' are much more significant. They contain a fresh and first-hand study of conditions and tendencies. Part III. starts with the doctrine that "the central fact of history, from a psychological point of view, may be said to be the gradual enlargement of social consciousness and rational co-operation." The view sometimes expressed that in tribal life there is lack of self-assertion, and that personality of the individual is merged in family or clan, is declared to be 'without foundation' when 'taken psychologically,' although 'from the standpoint of organization there is much truth in this.' (This appears to the reviewer a failure to carry through consistently the author's own central position, that self and society are simply correlative aspects of one reality. If the organization treats clan or group as indivisibly responsible, is it conceivable that this corresponds to no psychological attitude? Or if religion is organized entirely as a family or tribal affair, does not this imply a necessary limitation in psychological self-assertion? Of course *some* selves are asserted just as vigorously in savage life as in civilized life; but the social organization in such cases gives corresponding freedom, as to the warrior, whom the author cites.) "That which most inwardly distinguishes modern life from ancient or mediæval is the conscious power of the common people trying to effectuate their interests." The life of the group under modern conditions may express itself "on a level not merely of the

average member but of the most competent, of the best." Increasing social consciousness is inimical only to the 'individuality of isolation,' not to the individuality which rests on choice. The masses "contribute sentiment and common sense which gives momentum and general direction to progress, and as regards particulars finds its way by a shrewd choice of leaders." This part closes with a thoughtful discussion of the present trend toward social idealism and brotherhood, on the one hand, and of the confusion in standards which favors selfishness and exploitation, on the other.

In Part IV., 'Social Classes,' we have an especially instructive discussion of the present stratification of society. In particular the advantages and disadvantages of 'open classes' as versus more fixed conditions are presented. Most Americans assume that a free opportunity to rise from one class to another — freedom of individual opportunity and career — is an unmixed blessing and in fact leaves little to be desired. But as Professor Cooley well says, "there is also a freedom of class, or of those individuals who have not the wish or power to depart from the sphere of life in which circumstance has placed them:" "not opportunity to get out of them (their groups) but to be something in them; a chance for the teamster to have comfort, culture and good surroundings for himself and his family without ceasing to be a teamster." "That it is wrong to keep a man down who might rise is quite familiar, but that those who cannot rise or do not care to have also just claims, is almost a novel idea." "Now if the ablest men are constantly getting out of a given class the tendency is inevitably to weaken that class, to make it an easy prey, to render it less capable of getting a fair share in the goods of life. The main guaranty for freedom of this latter sort is some kind of class organization which shall resist the encroachment and neglect of which the weaker parties in society are in constant danger." It is further noted that an 'open' class into which all the more ambitious and capable aspire to pass ultimately may be more stable than a fixed higher class, and that such a class exercises upon the ideals of those who hope to enter it, or of those professions which are brought into intimate relation with it, an influence altogether out of proportion to its size. Most of us exist in an "upper-class atmosphere and are so pervaded by it that it is not easy for us to understand or fairly judge the sentiment of the hand-working classes."

Parts V. on 'Institutions' and VI. on 'Public Will' are less satisfactory. They do not give such intensive analysis and hence in many cases hardly present more than the surface and obvious reflec-

tions, but they serve a purpose for the general reader in rounding out a survey of social structure.

J. H. T.

Kafir Socialism and the Dawn of Individualism. DUDLEY KIDD.
London, A. and C. Black. Pp. xi + 286.

While the purpose of this book is primarily to consider the practical problems which face the British in dealing with the Kafirs, the first two chapters on 'Primitive Socialism,' and 'Kafir Conceptions of Justice' are excellent statements of Kafir psychology on these points, illustrating further and restating the general views as to Kafir clan life set forth in the author's two former books on the subject.

J. H. T.

Herd Instinct and its Bearing on the Psychology of Civilized Man. W. TROTTER. Sociological Review, 1908, I., 227-248; 1909, II., 31-54.

Sociology is that science whose material is man in society. The key to the problem of conduct in man thus related is feeling, and feeling has fundamental relations to instinct. The instincts regarded as fundamental by psychology are those of self-preservation, nutrition, and sex. But to account for all the facts of human life we must include gregariousness.

Biologically considered, the animal kingdom shows two sudden advances in complexity and in the size of the unit upon which natural selection acts unmodified: the advance (1) from the unicellular to the multicellular, and (2) from the solitary to the social. Progress demands the enlargement of the unit, and, when this is no longer possible by increase of physical complexity, gregariousness appears. There are differences of opinion as to the characteristics of mind due to gregariousness, but it certainly furnishes such characteristics as the feeling of homogeneity with the herd, sensitiveness to the behavior of fellows, instinctive sanctions of beliefs and actions due to the herd impulse, and non-rational opinion arising from belief in affirmations sanctioned by the herd. These non-rational judgments have the quality of instinctive opinion, or obviousness; and to question their truth is to the believer scepticism. When, therefore, we entertain an opinion whose basis involves a quality of feeling which tells us that to inquire into it would be absurd, obviously unnecessary, wicked, etc., that opinion is a non-rational one. This feeling of primary certitude is due to gregariousness.

In distinction from the other instincts, gregariousness exercises a

power from without and confers the sanction of instinct upon acts not necessarily pleasant. With its appearance, duty first appeared in the world, arising from the conflict of gregariousness with the other instincts. From this conflict there are four possible outcomes: The conflict may end (1) through the subsidence of either antagonist; (2) through scepticism as to the nature of the herd suggestion; (3) through rationalization of the problem; (4) in mental disintegration. The second and third of these solutions result in that class of persons called 'mentally stable,' which forms the basis of the state. The fourth includes a part of the insane, victims of nervous diseases, vice, etc., whose characteristic is inadaptability.

The article concludes with some remarks on the possible influence of gregariousness on the future of man.

E. JORDAN.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

Zur Psychophysik der industriellen Arbeit. MAX WEBER.
Archiv für Sozialwiss. und Sozialpolitik, XXVII., 730-770;
XXVIII., 219-277, 719-761; XXIX., 513-542.

The question under consideration in these articles is the causes and conditions of efficiency in laborers. Their interest for social psychology consists chiefly in their suggesting the practicability of attacking social problems upon the psychological side by an adaptation of the methods and results of experimental psychology combined with the statistical and other empirical methods of the social sciences.

While it would be difficult to devise laboratory experiments that would accurately reproduce all the conditions of work in a factory, we can hope to see this done to some extent, and, what is of more importance, the results already obtained in psychophysics are of value in furnishing information, and suggesting points to be observed in the study of workmen. The work of Kraepelin and his school is especially important for this purpose, and their contributions upon such subjects as practice, fatigue, relaxation, habit, and pauses are carefully considered, and their significance for this problem estimated.

However, these factors are only part of those to be taken into account. The efficiency of a workman at his machine is not merely a problem in psychophysics to be explained by the mechanical conditions of the machine, and the psychological principles capable of mechanical statement and experiment involved in his relationship to the machine. Only to a certain extent does labor thus become mechanized. His efficiency depends also upon his age, sex, domestic condi-

tion, education, temperament, and mood. It is further influenced by his intellectual and emotional attitudes and convictions upon such matters as labor tactics (*e. g.*, limitation of product in piece work), political issues (social democracy), and even religion (pietism having a clearly observable influence, and probably Catholicism also).

A minutely detailed account of the performance for some months of several workers engaged in weaving linen in a textile factory is reported and interpreted. Though the value of the results is acknowledgedly rendered uncertain by the necessarily small number of workers whom it was possible to study in this thorough manner, the rules governing the general tendency toward increased efficiency as a result of practice seem fairly clear, and the results of the other factors are noticeable and to some extent explainable. A clearly defined curve of efficiency for the different days of the week was found, Monday revealing the lowest degree of efficiency, and Wednesday the highest. The causes of this are extraneous to the work itself, and to be discovered in the manner of life of the workers. The individual life history of each worker includes the really important factors to be taken into account in addition to the mechanical elements, and must be made the subject of careful observation and study. This cannot be avoided by superficial classification into types based on 'mental tests' (such as the ergograph or reaction apparatus might suggest), nor by the employment of such vague or imperfectly understood conceptions as *milieu* or heredity.

While the results gained from the investigations reported do not impress one as extensive, and while large results can only be expected from this method when it has been employed by numerous workers in lengthy, detailed, and painstaking investigations, the arguments seem convincing that only by such faithful, thorough, and detailed work can any really scientific knowledge upon such subjects be had, and that in this way it can be obtained. As an instructive contribution to methodology the articles deserve the serious consideration of social psychologists.

W. K. WRIGHT.

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.

Le greffage social. RAOUL DE LA GRASSERIE. *Revue internat. de Sociologie*, 1909, XXVII., 321-358.

Grafting, a common practice in the vegetable, and by no means uncommon in the animal world, exists in society as well. The chief manifestations are classified as (1) ethical, as illustrated by the influ-

ence of the Greeks upon the barbarians, the Romans, and later upon the peoples of the Renaissance; (2) familial, as shown in the rite of adoption among the Chinese, Romans, etc.; (3) hereditary, as seen in education, both express and implied in institutions; (4) religious, as illustrated in the fusion of Greek and Roman gods; (5) political, as shown in one of its phases by the passage of republics (such as the Roman) into empires; (6) judicial, as shown by the fusion of the Roman and continental civil codes; and (7) the more strictly intellectual grafting as seen in language, literature, art and science.

In order to succeed, certain conditions are necessary: (1) there must be a certain homogeneity between the stem grafting, and that which is grafted upon; (2) the former must be of a better species, *i. e.*, higher in rank, while (3) the latter must be more vigorous and hardy, able to supply the lack of strength of the former. The principal instruments in the process are (1) war (though the influential stem may be either victor or vanquished), (2) religion, and (3) commerce. Certain obstacles present themselves in many instances otherwise favorable, *viz.*, (1) the spirit of opposition, as shown in the 'closed door' of the eastern world, or (2) conflicting interests of social classes, or (3) the 'indolence natural to man' which shrinks from the actual work involved. The effects of the process are (1) the addition to the one stem of the more valuable qualities of the second, and (2) the preservation for a long period of those qualities which would otherwise soon disappear. The essential nature of the process of grafting, here as elsewhere, consists in uniting the superior quality of a failing and disappearing subject to the more vigorous and robust nature of an object of inferior quality.

W. C. VOGT.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

L'anthropologie psychologique, son objet et sa methode. H. PIERON.

Revue de l'école d'anthrop. de Paris, 1909, XIX., 113-127.

Anthropology has neglected too much the psychological phase of its subject. The various sciences included under the study of man have an identical subject-matter, and investigations in one should be able to throw light on others. The fact that even the physiological phase of primitive peoples promises interesting results commends the field to the psychologist. May not the reciprocal relations of men influence the mental equipment of the individual not only as regards social activities, but also as regards the fundamental psychological functions, as memory, attention and even perception? The results of

such investigation could be used to throw light on questions such as the determination of the characters and causes of professional superiority, the relative influences of sex-difference, the problem of heredity and that of ontogenesis versus phylogenesis, etc.

W. C. VOGT.

Sexual Education and Nakedness. HAVELOCK ELLIS. Amer. Journal of Psychol., 1909, XX., 297-317.

Nakedness existed in the games of the Greeks and the theatres of the Romans, but with the identification of it with 'the flesh' and its consequent condemnation by Christianity it became repressed, although it appeared in various forms during the middle ages. But it gradually became 'aristocratic,' as versus the plebeian 'slavery of clothes,' and with the triumph of democratic sentiments in the 19th century its repression became complete, as shown by missionary zeal in clothing savages, failing to note the degrading and injurious character of their work. But this extremity caused a reaction in many minds, and an opposite movement has begun, advocating the practice of nakedness in gymnasiums, bathing places, and the like, on grounds of hygiene, in the interest of rational sexual training, and because of a certain positive moral value.

W. C. VOGT.

PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION.

Some Notes on the Evolution of Religion. IRVING KING. Philos. Review, 1909, XVIII., 38-47.

The forms of religion are so closely correlated with the social milieu which produces them that we cannot attempt to arrange them in a scale of higher and lower until we are able to evaluate the social background. Religions generally are so definitely the outcome of particular social conditions that no such external characteristics as fetichism, animism, theism, and the like, can place the religions of different groups in any vital relationship. A comparative study, as far as it is possible at all, might however start from the assumption that in different social matrices there are specialized attitudes having functional elements in common, such as might be called religious.

It seems that some criterion of religion might be formulated in terms of social psychology which would at least serve as a working hypothesis, its validity to be determined through its use. Certain elements in the life of a people come to consciousness as having peculiar value, and therefore the religious attitude, a special case of this larger

sense of value, is directly related to and is an integral part of the practical and spontaneous adjustments of the people concerned. If this is the correct view, there is no such thing as a permanently existing religious instinct, sense or attitude, which continues independently of these objective conditions of life.

J. J. TAFT.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

Religion and the Psychical Life. EDWARD SCRIBNER AMES.
Inter. Jour. of Ethics, 1909, XX., 48-62.

This article is a chapter from a forthcoming book on the Psychology of Religion and gives its viewpoint.

The results of genetic social psychology make it possible to overcome the various partial and limited conceptions of the relation of religion and life. Since the religious consciousness according to these results is just the consciousness of the greatest interests and purposes of life in their most idealized and intensified forms, it is evident that in its generic nature religion is a most intimate aspect of human life. Everywhere the sacred objects and functions are those in which the life of society is felt to center. But different stages in social development estimate these things differently and express social valuations in different ways. The moralization of religion moves forward with the practical and ethical developments of the race. If the organized, institutionalized forms of religion appear barren and powerless, it is likely that a more real and vital religious consciousness will be found in other social movements which are not yet designated as religious and may not even regard themselves as such.

The ideal values of each age and of each type of social development tend to reach an intensity and a volume and a symbolic expression which is religious. Morality, then, cannot be separated from religion. Some forms of early religious consciousness may be lacking in moral quality but no genuinely moral consciousness can be without religious quality. In so far as religion is non-moral, it is primitive and controlled by custom. On the other hand, all moral ideals are religious in the degree to which they are the expression of great, vital interests of society. Religion, like every other specialized interest of man, involves the reaction of his entire nature. It is not the product of any one agency within him. In its most natural, normal development, it is just the expression and appreciation of those ideal relationships and values which are inherent in all earnest moral effort.

J. J. TAFT.

Religious Folk-Songs of the Southern Negroes. H. W. ODUM.
Amer. Jour. of Rel. Psy. and Ed., 1909, III., 265-365.

To obtain the truest expression of the folk-mind and feeling is to reveal much of the inner consciousness of a race. And the knowledge of those evidences which are most representative of race-life constitutes the ground work of a knowledge of social and moral tendencies, hence of social and moral needs. The student of race traits and tendencies must accept testimony from within the race, and in the study of race character the value of true expressions of the feelings and mental imagery cannot be overestimated.

As a part of folk-lore, folk song represents less of the traditional and more of the spontaneous. In revealing what he is, the folk songs of the southern negro are superior to any superficial study made from partial observations. The songs here presented are the representative average religious songs current among the common mass of negroes of the present generation. An analysis of these songs brings out certain mental traits of the negro together with the essential qualities of his religion. Perhaps the most interesting points made, from the standpoint of social psychology, are the negro's indifference in regard to home and family, and the ideality and impracticality of his religion.

J. J. TAFT.

BOOKS RECEIVED FROM NOVEMBER 5 TO DECEMBER 5.

La Psychologie Sociale de Gabriel Tarde. AMÉDÉE MATAGRIN.
Paris, Alcan, 1909. Pp. 352. 5 fr.

Problèmes de Psychologie Affective. TH. RIBOT. Paris, Alcan,
1909. Pp. 270. 2 fr. 50.

Consciousness. HENRY RUTGERS MARSHALL. New York, Mac-
millan, 1909. Pp. xv + 685. \$4.00 net.

Le Problème Morale et la Pensée Contemporaine. D. PARODI.
Paris, Alcan, 1909. Pp. 210. 2 fr. 50.

Die Geistige Ermüdung. MAX OFFNER. Berlin, Reuther u.
Reichard, 1909. Pp. vi + 88. M. 1.80.

Why American Marriages Fail. ANNA A. ROGERS. Boston,
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1909. Pp. 214. \$1.25 net.

Tlingit Myths and Texts. JOHN R. SWANTON. Washington,
Government Printing Office, 1909. Pp. viii + 451. (Bulletin 39,
Bureau of American Ethnology.)

La Joie Passive. M. MIGNARD. Paris, Alcan, 1909. Pp. xii + 276. 4 fr.

Clavis Universalis. ARTHUR COLLIER. Ed. w. introd. and notes by ETHEL BOWMAN. Chicago, Open Court Publ. Co., 1909. Pp. xxv + 140.

NOTES AND NEWS.

THE fifth annual meeting of the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology will be held in affiliation with the Southern Educational Association at Charlotte, N. C., beginning Tuesday, December 28, 1909.

KARL T. WAUGH, Ph.D. (Harvard), of the department of psychology of the University of Chicago, has been elected to the chair of philosophy and psychology at Beloit College.

THE present number of the BULLETIN, dealing especially with social psychology, has been prepared under the editorial care of Professor J. H. Tufts.

THE following appointments are noted in the press: Dr. Edmund B. Huey, of the University of Pittsburg, to the charge of a new department of clinical psychology in the state institution for the feeble-minded, at Lincoln, Ill. G. N. Gilbertson, A.M., to be instructor in psychology at the University of Colorado. Dr. G. C. Fracker, of Coe College, to the chair of psychology and education at the State Normal School, Marquette, Mich. Dr. L. S. Anderson, of Marquette, to the University of Illinois. Dr. F. S. Newell to the chair of philosophy and psychology at Coe College. Dr. Edwin Katzenellenbogen to be lecturer in abnormal psychology at Harvard University. Dr. E. H. Henderson, from the chair of education and psychology to that of philosophy at Adelphi College, Brooklyn. Professor Joseph Jastrow, of the University of Wisconsin, will give graduate courses in psychology at Columbia University in the second semester of this year.

THE first number of a new monthly, the *Journal of Educational Psychology*, is announced for January. The editors are W. C. Bagley, J. Carleton Bell (managing editor), C. E. Seashore, and G. M. Whipple (subsc. \$1.50; Williams & Wilkins, Baltimore, publishers).

ERRATUM.—On page 421, line 11, for *inadaptibility* read *sensitivity*.

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